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INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 2016, the UK voted narrowly (52:48) to leave the European Union (EU). The UK government then notified the EU officially on March 29, 2017, of its intention to leave, thus triggering Article 50 of the EU Treaty which specifies that within two years the UK will cease to be a member. The date for 'Brexit' is thus clear, but the nature of the economic relationship between the UK and the remaining EU-27 is still to be defined.
First principles of economics suggest that Brexit will have an economic cost for both sides as trade in both goods and services between the UK and EU-27 will no longer be (nearly) frictionless as it is at present. The size of these economic costs is uncertain, but they are likely to be substantial since at present trade across the Channel is very large: €306 billion of exports of goods by the EU27 to the UK, versus €184 billion of imports. In terms of % shares of GDP, the EU27's exports to the UK amount to 2.5% of GDP, whereas the UK's exports to the EU27 amount to 7.5% of its GDP. For comparison, transatlantic trade of goods is only about 20 % larger than trade across the channel.
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For services the amounts are also large: €94 billion of exports by the EU27 to the UK, versus €122 billion of imports, and thus a surplus in this case for the UK (although here the statistics are not so reliable, with big differences seen in the 'mirror data' for the same items as measured by the EU27).
Foreign direct investments (FDI) flows and stocks are also very large on both sides. The EU27's stock of FDI in the UK is estimated at €985 billion, or 8.3% of its GDP, while the UK's investment in the EU27 total a little less in value at €683 billion but this is a much bigger in relation to its GDP (26.6%). However, there are indications that a significant proportion, maybe more than one half, of this FDI represent financial operations whose purpose is to optimise tax liabilities of multinational corporations.
Leaving the EU will not affect only trade, but also the legal status of the large number of EU27 citizens living in the UK (estimated at 3.35 million as of end 2016). The largest number are workers (2,002,000), compared to pensioners (223,000) and the unemployed (102,000). The number of UK citizens living in EU27 countries is substantially less: 1,217,000, of which 400,000 are pensioners, with remainder being workers and their dependent families, and students.
Another economic impact of Brexit is that the UK will no longer contribute to the EU budget, which would thus no longer count on the €9 billion annual net contribution of the UK. This might be offset to some extent by a continuing contribution by the UK if it were agreed to secure a high degree or market access, or from tariff revenues if the relationship would be based just on WTO membership terms. There is a question also of other 'legacy costs', which as of now, however, are neither defined nor quantified beyond speculative remarks in the range of the order of €20-40 billion.
The focus of this contribution will be on trade relations and how the expected costs of leaving the EU's internal market would be distributed across the two parties, which in turn, should affect their negotiating positions.
In principle there are two alternative extreme scenarios: (1) the UK would accede to the European Economic Area (EEA) as a non-member state like Norway, or (2) the UK would have no preferential trade relationship with the EU, which would imply that cross Channel trade would take place only under general World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
In between these two extremes there are quite a number of possibilities for free trade arrangements of varying depth, which are described below. However, the UK Prime Minister in her speech of Agreement (CFTA).
It is clear that the default scenario, in the event that the negotiations fail to reach agreement within two years after the triggering of Article 50, is the WTO scenario. This means that the most plausible range of possible outcomes now consists of some kind of CFTA as the most optimistic, through to the WTO as the most pessimistic.
Economic impacts in short
There has been a considerable amount of quantitative modelling work done on various Brexit scenarios by both official institutions (UK Treasury, OECD) and independent economists. These all cover ranges of scenarios in the optimistic-pessimistic spectrum, including the spread between the EEA and WTO scenarios highlighted above. However, as we have just noted, the plausible range of scenarios has been narrowed, excluding the EEA.
Nonetheless the modelling work has produced a cluster of relatively consistent results. The main story is one of economic losses by both parties, but disproportionately between them in money amounts in a ratio of around 1 to 2 or 3 for the UK and the EU27 respectively. In terms of percentages of GDP, the losses for the EU27 would be about 10 to 15 times lower given the 1:5 ratio in the GDP of the UK relative that of the EU-27.
For the EU27 the losses are virtually insignificant, averaging between 0.08% and 0.44% of GDP for the optimistic versus pessimistic scenarios respectively. These amounts are modelled as the totals cumulating up to 2030, so the annual average losses would be of the order of 0.008% to 0.044 % of GDP.
For the UK the losses average between 1.31% and 4.21% of GDP for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios respectively, or 0.13% to 0.41% of GDP annually. Among the different models it is also notable that the losses for the UK are higher than average in the case of two models (OECD and UK Treasury) that capture negative impacts on foreign direct investment (FDI), which is redirected in some degree away from the UK into the EU27. In their pessimistic scenarios the losses cumulate to about 7.5% of GDP, or 0.75% annually, which are highly significant amounts in macroeconomic terms. This FDI effect is not, however, reflected in models estimated for the EU27, and so implies that there might need to be some adjustment to the results reported above for the EU27.
In the following, we provide a study on several aspects of the possible economic impact of Brexit on the EU27, covering (1) the current level of trade in goods and services between the UK and EU27 as a share of GDP, and labour flows, distinguishing between member state and sectors, (2) an indication of the possible economic impact of at least two alternative scenarios, European Economic Area (EEA) or World Trade Organisation (WTO), and (3) an indication of the key characteristics of a wider range of different types of bilateral agreements that exist between the EU and third countries, including also customs unions, free trade agreements, association agreements, stabilisation and association agreements, partnership and cooperation agreements, etc.
We do not go into the details in which the 'middle' scenarios differ, address all these points, in a 
BASIC FACTS: TRADE AND INVESTMENT

Trade in goods
The volume or trade between the UK and EU27 is very substantial, with EU27 enjoying a large surplus. The EU27's exports to the UK totalled €306 billion, whereas it imports amounted to only a little above half as much, at €184 billion (all data in this section relate to 2015 unless otherwise stated). In terms of % shares of GDP, the EU27's exports to the UK amount to 2.5% of GDP, whereas the UK's exports to the EU27 amount to 7.1% of GDP. Looked at from the import side the proportions are even wider, reflecting the UK's large trade deficit with the EU: UK's imports from the EU amount to 11.9% of GDP, whereas the EU27's imports from the UK amount to only 1.5% of their
GDP.
As regards the sectoral breakdown of the trade flows, the aggregate data for the EU27's trade with the UK is given in Table 2 . The sectoral distribution of this trade is highly diversified, with the following leading sectors for exports from the EU27 to the UK: machinery and transport equipment (€127 billion), of which road vehicles (€59 billion), followed by other manufactured goods (€70 billion), chemicals (€51 billion), food products (€32 billion), and mineral fuels (€11 billion). The UK has a deficit in most sectors, especially automotive and surplus mainly in mineral fuels and aircraft (and associated equipment).
Trade in services
The trade in services is also very substantial in volume, with €94 billion of exports from EU27 to the UK, and €122 in imports. When imports and exports of services are taken together their total of €306 billion is not all that much less than for the €394 billion total for goods. However, the big difference here is that the UK has a significant surplus with EU27 on account of services (€28 billion), compared to its huge deficit on account of goods (€128 billion). Services is one area where Transatlantic trade is much more important the trade between the EU-27 and the UK. In 2015 EU exports of services were worth about €190 billion and imports worth almost €200 billion. The Transatlantic turnover in services trade was thus about 2 times larger than that across the Channel.
A big word of caution, however, is called for over these services data. Difficulties in the statistical recording of trade in services are known to be substantial. In particular 'mirror statistics' show big divergences. 'Mirror statistics' are where each side of a bilateral trade relationship is in principle measuring the same thing (e.g. UK exports to Belgium should equal Belgian imports from the UK). The actual 'mirror statistics' for UK-EU27 trade in services show indeed big differences (Emerson et al., 2017, Annex 5) . Thus the Belgian services deficit with the UK is recorded to be €1.8 billion according to UK data, whereas the Belgian data suggest the deficit to be only €0.1 billion. The biggest divergence is in the case of Ireland, where according to UK data the UK has a large surplus of €6.1 billion, whereas according to Irish data it is Ireland that enjoys an even bigger surplus of €11.5 billion. Unfortunately, the official statisticians, be it from Eurostat or national agencies, do not seem able to throw much light on these differences, no doubt because various service flows are so difficult to record.
Sectoral data also exist in the aggregate for UK services trade with the EU27, but not the full matrix by country and sector. We do not provide this detail as the data would anyway be highly unreliable for the reasons given above. See also Belke, Dubova and Osowski (2017) .
In terms of the balance of trade in services the main items are the UK's surplus on account of financial services (€20 billion), its deficit on account of travel and transport (largely tourism, €11 billion), whereas the substantial trade in business services is more nearly balanced.
Foreign direct investment
Data is available on both stocks and flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) of the UK and the EU27. These data are relatively complete for the worldwide flows and stocks of FDI (Table 4 and Emerson et al., 2017, Annex 6) . However, the bilateral data as between the UK and individual member states have some gaps, and contain some apparent distortions (Table 5 and Emerson et al., 2017, Annex 7).
The worldwide stocks of FDI are massive in both directions, with the EU27 having a stock of €7,033 billion of outward investments, while receiving €5,692 billion of inward investments. The UK has a stock of €1,386 outward investments and about the same amount of inward investments, at €1,314 billion.
UK investments in the EU27 of €683 billion looks reasonably proportioned in relation to the worldwide total of €5,692 billion investments in the EU27. However, in the statistics for EU27 investment in the UK the data seems implausible, with €985 billion of inward investments from the EU27 accounting for a very large share (75%) of the total worldwide investment in the UK of €1,314 billion. The source of this implausibility seems to be the huge reported amount of Dutch investments in the UK of €454 billion, which is related to the important amount of nominal investments in the Netherlands (see Emerson et al., 2017, Annex 7) , which in reality are only intermediate investments in transit from other sources. 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS: QUANTITATIVE ESTIMATES
Model-based simulations
There has been a number of model-based attempts to simulate the impact of Brexit, of which several estimate the impacts on both the UK and the EU27. Of these three are from official sources While these model simulations cannot capture all the likely economic effects of the Brexit, they do provide a cluster of findings that are close to a consensus view on the relative size of the impacts. Given that the UK trade with the EU27 is a much bigger fraction of the UK's GDP than that of the EU27, it is hardly surprising that the economic impacts are much higher for the UK.
The hypotheses for these studies are quite similar, in that they all simulate a range of scenarios that we call either 'optimistic', meaning a small increase in trade barriers between the two parties, or 'pessimistic', meaning a much larger increase in trade barriers. Some also have a 'central' scenario between the two polar cases. The optimistic scenario in several cases assumes that the UK would enjoy a regime close to that as member of the European Economic Area like Norway.
The pessimistic scenario usually assumes that the trading relationship between the UK and the EU27 is reduced to the terms of their WTO membership, with tariffs introduced at most favoured nations (m.f.n.) rates. This is widely called the 'hard Brexit'.
We will concentrate in most of this section on the impact of Brexit on GDP, which is also the focus of most models. Some of the models also report the impact on trade flows. For instance, Lawless and Morgenroth (2016) estimate a fall of the EU27's exports to the UK of 30% and for UK's exports to the EU27 of 22% taking into account only the introduction of WTO m.f.n. tariffs.
However, given the differences in the size of trade flows this translates into a decline of only 2% of total (worldwide) EU27 exports. The impact of Brexit on some individual Member States, like
Ireland and Belgium is of course estimated to be the much larger, with these two countries facing a reduction in total exports equal to 4% and 3.1%. For the UK, the impact of Brexit on total exports is considerably larger, 9.8%. Roja-Romagosa (2016) arrive at broadly similar results.
They predict, that the fall in EU27 exports to the UK would amount to 3% in the WTO scenario and of 1.7% in the FTA scenario. For the UK, instead, total exports would decrease by 21.8% and 12.5% in the WTO and FTA scenarios respectively.
For the EU27 on average there are losses of 0.08 to 0.44% of GDP for the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios respectively. These results cumulate over the whole decade until 2030, which means that if the impacts were spread evenly over these years, the annual average impact would be of the order of 0.01 to 0.04% of GDP: i.e. the impacts would be insignificant and hardly noticeable at the macro-economic level for the whole EU27 economy. This does not exclude that individual sectors, or some small member states would be more significantly affected, on which we comment further below.
The results for the UK are much larger, where the losses average 1.31 to 4.21% of GDP for the optimistic and pessimist scenarios respectively. Since the ratio of the UK economy to the EU27 is about 1:5 a disproportionate result in terms of a % of GDP was to be expected. If the absolute loss were of the same size for both sides one would have expected that the loss as a % of GDP should be 'only' five times higher for the UK. But as a % of GDP the average loss for the UK is about ten times higher, or more.
Since the ratio of the UK economy to the EU27 is about 1:5 a disproportionate result in terms of a % of GDP was to be expected. If the absolute loss were of the same size for both sides one would have expected that the loss as a % of GDP should be 'only' five times higher for the UK.
But as a % of GDP the average loss for the UK is about ten times higher, or more.
The model results in terms of the impacts on GDP are summarized in Figure 1 below in billions of euro. The loss for the EU-27 is on the horizontal axis, that for the UK on the vertical axis.
This figure also contains a 45 degrees line. All points are above this line, which indicates that the absolute loss is in all cases to be estimated to be higher for the UK than for the EU. Moreover, most of the studies (essentially all except CPB) align on a line with slope 2, implying that most studies find that the losses from Brexit would be twice as high for the UK as for the EU-27. Why is the loss (from leaving the EU's internal market) distributed so asymmetrically? Economic theory predicts only that both sides will lose from creating new trade barriers. However, general economic principles also suggest that larger economies lose less from the imposition of a tariff because of the greater market power of its enterprises. Suppose that two trading partners both impose a tariff of 5% on each other's exports. Firms from the larger economy will be more likely to face an inelastic demand curve, allowing them to adjust their selling price for the tariff. By contrast, firms from the smaller economy are more likely to be price takers. They might thus have to cut the export price to keep market shares, and so bear the cost themselves. There is thus a fundamental reason why trade agreements between large and small countries tend to be asymmetric, and why the losses from Brexit are likely to be borne primarily by the UK (despite the fact that the UK is a net importer of goods from the EU).
The OECD and UK Treasury models represent a deeper set of impacts from FDI, which go beyond investment and trade volumes (OECD, 2016 , Treasury, 2016 . FDI is found, in various empirical studies taken into account in the two models, to have a favourable impact on R & D expenditures and thence on innovation and competitiveness, as also on general management quality.
3
One outlier among the model results is that of Booth/Open Europe, which, however, adopts a radically different 'optimistic' scenario, namely the ultra-liberal formula whereby the UK would adopt free trade unilaterally both with the EU and the whole of the rest of the world, without negotiating counterpart concessions from anyone (Booth, Howarth and Persson, 2015) .
3.2
Going beyond the models: lessons from other approaches
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
Another way to estimate the costs of Brexit for the EU27 is to use the studies done in preparation of TTIP, which would have involved the opposite of Brexit, namely an elimination of WTO m.f.n.
tariffs and a reduction of non-tariff barriers (NTBs).
The comparison between Brexit and TTIP is more interesting than appears at first sight. The US economy is of course several times larger than that of the UK, but trans-Atlantic trade is of a similar order of magnitude to trans-Channel trade. Trans-Atlantic goods trade was in 2015 only about 20 % larger than the trade in goods between the UK and the EU27. The impact of Brexit might thus be comparable to that of TTIP with the sign reversed. Trade in services is, however, twice as large across the Atlantic than across the Channel.
Studies of scenarios for the TTIP came to the conclusion that the elimination of tariffs alone would not lead to large gains. The Commission's own website puts it succinctly: "Given the low average tariffs (under 3%), the key to unlocking this potential lies in the tackling of non-tariff barriers.
These consist mainly of customs procedures and behind the border regulatory restrictions."
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The widely accepted result from the economic impact studies which used a similar approach (and models) to those surveyed here for Brexit, was that TTIP would increase EU GDP by about 0.5 % of GDP, with 0.1 % of GDP due to the elimination of tariffs between the EU and the US, and 0.4 % of GDP due to the lowering (typically halving) of NTBs. 
Lessons from the literature on the benefits of EU membership
Another way to estimate the cost of Brexit is to consider that the cost of Brexit should be the mirror of the benefit of EU membership. There is a substantial literature which shows significant gains from EU and single market membership. If one were to accept the conclusions of this literature, one would conclude models surveyed here might understate the cost of Brexit.
One of the first studies to incorporate the many effects of a Single Market, was done by the CPB (Straathof et al., 2008) , which used a blended CGE/macro-econometric model (Worldscan) to arrive at benefits of EU membership of 10 % of GDP or more. A novel attempt was undertaken by Campos, Coricelli and Moretti (2014) based on a synthetic counterfactual for the EU countries which joined in 1973 or later: they come to an average gain of 12 % of GDP (except for Greece), with more for the UK. Because the WTO has become more comprehensive in scope and a little 'deeper' too, in the meantime, the implied costs of exiting might be today a little less high.
Another variant of the counterfactual approach is Breuss (2006) , comparing Switzerland and Austria given their respective choices for market integration in Europe, which also arrives at large benefits for Austria.
A related way to estimate the cost of Brexit is to consider the benefits expected from existing or planned free trade agreements of the EU with other nations around the globe. The exits costs can be derived from so-called impact assessment studies on the free trade agreements EU-Canada, EU-India, EU-Japan, EU-Mercosur, EU-Mexico and EU-South Korea. Table 6 below summarises the expected benefits from these free trade agreements or just plans.
They involve different degrees of trade liberalisation and different levels of development.
However, a general trend is clear. In all these cases, the EU would enjoy only a disproportionally small share of the total benefit -not just because it is economically larger than its counterparts but also for fundamental reasons such as greater market power of its enterprises. With a changed sign this implies that exiting these free trade agreements would impose the majority of the costs on the exiting country.
In any event, the large negative effects in the models used on Brexit are a priori consistent with this new literature on the EU benefits for countries concluding a free trade agreement with the EU being quite large, and should not be dismissed too swiftly. All available studies concur that Brexit will lead to a significant disruption of trade links and will impose economic costs on both sides. However, the EU27 would bear only a disproportionally small share of the total cost. A similar picture emerges from the literature studying the potential benefits from free trade agreements the EU has, or is, negotiating with third countries (e.g. Japan, Korea, etc.). The relationship between economic size and bargaining power has two implications:
First of all, the EU should have the stronger bargaining position in the negotiations on the future economic arrangements between the UK and the EU27. The cost of the disruption resulting from not reaching an agreement would fall primarily on the UK. Secondly, the Britain might have difficulties negotiating favourable trade arrangements with other large countries, such as the US, Japan or China. The most recent results from the general election 2017 in the UK and the uncertainty generated by them will of course tend to increase the economic costs of Brexit for the country even further via their negative impact on investment-type decisions.
